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ABSTRACT
The impact of segregation on Black political efficacy is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, increased
contact among Blacks in more segregated areas may mean that Blacks are better able to coordinate
political behavior. On the other hand, lesser contact with non-Blacks may mean that Blacks have less
political influence over voters of other races. As for non-Blacks, inter-group conflict theory suggests
that greater contact yields greater conflict between the groups while inter-group contact theory suggests
exactly the reverse. We investigate this question empirically.  We find that exogenous increases in
segregation lead to decreases in Black civic efficacy, as measured by an ability to elect Representatives
who vote liberally and more specifically in favor of legislation that is favored by Blacks. This tendency
for Representatives from more segregated MSAs to vote more conservatively arises in spite of the
fact that Blacks in more segregated areas hold more liberal political views than do Blacks in less segregated
locales. We find evidence that this decrease in efficacy is driven by more conservative attitudes amongst
non-Blacks in more segregated areas.
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“The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down 
injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different 
from other men.” 
--Lyndon B. Johnson 
 
I Introduction 
  A large literature suggests that segregation is associated with more negative 
outcomes for Blacks.
1  Blacks in more segregated areas are found to have higher infant 
mortality, lower educational attainment, and fare worse on a host of other outcomes than 
Blacks in less segregated areas.  Ananat (2007) shows that even when the endogeneity of 
segregation is carefully controlled for, Blacks in more segregated cities have lower 
education, employment and earnings than their counterparts in less segregated cities. 
In this paper we explore the impact of segregation on a previously unexamined 
outcome: politics. Although the relationship between political outcomes and area racial 
and ethnic heterogeneity has been extensively studied,
2 this is the first paper, to our 
knowledge, to examine the relationship between segregation and Black civic efficacy. 
We define Black political efficacy
3 as the ability to elect Representatives who vote (in 
Congress) in a manner that the Black electorate favors. Under this definition, it is clear 
that the political views and actions of both Black and non-Black citizens will affect 
efficacy. In fact, given that in no MSA are Blacks a majority of the population, the 
behavior of non-Blacks may be more important than the behavior of Blacks in 
determining Black political efficacy. A priori, the relationship between segregation and 
                                                 
1 See for example Massey and Denton (1995).  
2 This literature concludes that both political participation and public goods expenditures are decreasing in 
racial heterogeneity. See Costa and Kahn (2003) for a summary. 
3 We use the terms “political efficacy” and “civic efficacy” interchangeably.   2
Black civic efficacy is ambiguous. On the one hand, the more segregated Blacks are the 
more contact they have with other Blacks and thus the more likely they are to be able to 
influence Black political behavior. On the other hand, the less segregated Blacks are the 
more contact they have with non-Blacks and the more likely they are to be able to 
influence non-Black political behavior. As for non-Blacks’ propensity to align 
themselves politically with Blacks, inter-group conflict theory suggests that greater 
contact yields greater conflict between the groups while inter-group contact theory 
suggests exactly the reverse. (See for example Taylor 1998 and Bobo 1988 on inter-group 
conflict theory and Johnson et. al 2000, 2001 on inter-group contact theory). 
  We bring empirical evidence to bear on this theoretical ambiguity. Clearly the 
challenge to an empirical analysis of the impact of segregation on any outcome is the 
endogeneity of segregation. (For example, perhaps non-Black residents’ preference for 
interactions with Blacks influences both the level of segregation and the level of Black 
efficacy.)  We circumvent this difficulty by using the railroad division index developed in 
Ananat (2007) to instrument for segregation. Before the Great Migration--the large 
movement of Blacks from the South to the North during the years 1915 to 1950
4--Blacks 
predominantly lived in former slave-holding states. The instrument exploits the fact that 
this Great Migration occurred after the vast majority of the country’s present day railroad 
tracks had been laid. The more subdivisions created in a city by the tracks (conditional on 
the total amount of track in the city), the easier it was in that city to confine (segregate) 
Blacks in neighborhoods whose boundaries were defined by these tracks. (One limitation 
of this identification strategy is that we can only explore the impact of segregation on 
civic efficacy outside of the South.) 
                                                 
4 Some historians put the end date of the Great Migration at as late as 1970.    3
  Employing the railroad instrument, we find that in the non-South, segregation, 
conditional on area racial heterogeneity, has a negative causal impact on Black civic 
efficacy. The more segregated the metro area, the less likely that its residents are 
represented in the United States House by a Black representative or by an individual of 
either race who is from the Democratic Party
5 or who votes in accordance with the 
desires of Black residents on civil rights and other issues. Although the relationship 
between segregation and our various measures of efficacy is not always significant, it is 
remarkably consistent. The negative relationship has held from the first redistricting 
period after the Voting Rights Act through the most recently completed redistricting 
period (or from 1973-2002). Given evidence that the tendency for Blacks to align 
themselves towards the left in the political continuum is increasing in segregation, our 
findings demonstrate that Black civic efficacy is decreasing in segregation.  
  What is the channel by which segregation impacts Black civic efficacy? We find 
no evidence that variation in district demographic configuration drives our results. We 
also rule out variation in voter turnout by race as a possible explanation. We do, however, 
find evidence that in more segregated areas non-Blacks are more likely to hold negative 
views of Blacks and of policies that aid Blacks. Further, we find some support for the 
argument that segregation increases divergence between Black and non-Black political 
views. Because Blacks are a minority of the population in all metro areas, this 
polarization could explain the finding that Black civic efficacy is decreasing in 
segregation.  
As exemplified by the quotations with which we began, there is a deep-seated 
belief in this country in the ability to effect change by pulling a lever on Election Day. 
                                                 
5 Blacks vote Democratic 70 to 90% of the time in two-party elections (McDermott 1998).   4
Such a belief implies that Black political efficacy may be a mediator in the relationship 
between segregation and Black economic outcomes. Thus our results suggest that 
decreased political efficacy may explain in part why Blacks’ economic outcomes are 
decreasing in segregation.
6   
We present these results in detail, after describing the data and methodology in 
the next section. 
II Data and Methods 
II.A Sample 
We examine the changing relationship between segregation and political 
outcomes across decades. Our focal period is 1973
7-2002, which includes every 
completed redistricting period since the Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 outlawed 
literacy tests and other barriers to Black enfranchisement.  
Our unit of observation in each decade is the Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA).
8 We focus on the MSA for two reasons: First, The MSA is not a political unit. 
Political boundaries, most notably congressional districts, are defined by the individuals 
who hold political power.
9 The relationship between segregation and political units may 
be endogenous. Thus we measure segregation at the MSA level, treating the 
configuration of the congressional districts to which MSA residents belong as an outcome 
variable. Second, a focus on MSAs avoids a second source of endogeneity: intra-urban 
                                                 
6 We recognize, however, that the direction of causation may also run from economic outcomes to civic 
efficacy.  
7 We also include the 1972 election which chose the members of the 93
rd Congress which commenced in 
1973. 
8 A Metropolitan Statistical Area is comprised of a county or set of counties that contain a central city of at 
least 50,000 inhabitants “plus adjacent counties with a high degree of integration with the central county as 
measured by commuting” (Office of Management and Budget 2000, 82238). 
9 States are political units whose boundaries are not decided by those who currently hold power. However, 
many states are too large (and contain too many areas in which Blacks do not reside) to speak about state 
segregation meaningfully. Nearly 90% of Black Americans live within an MSA. (McKinnon 2003).    5
residential sorting (Cutler and Glaeser 1997). For example, the most politically 
efficacious Blacks may choose to live in the least segregated parts of the metro area. 
More specifically, we examine outcomes for 312
10 MSAs identified by Cutler and 
Glaeser (1997) as having more than 1000 Black residents in the 1990 Census. One 
difficulty in comparing MSAs from decade to decade is that MSA definitions change 
with each census. We overcome this limitation by holding our MSA definitions 
constant
11 as we trace political outcomes back to the 1970’s. 
II.B. Segregation Indexes 
  Our primary measure of segregation is the dissimilarity index, defined as 















where  N i K 1 = is the array of census tracts in the area. According to this measure, the 
level of segregation in our sample has fallen across the three decades. The first row of 
Table I shows mean dissimilarity for 1970, 1980 and 1990. The value of .69 in the first 
cell of the table indicates that in 1970 69% of the Black population would have had to 
relocate to different census tracts for there to be an even proportion of Black residents 
throughout the average MSA. By 1990 that figure had dropped to 56%. While the 
average level of segregation has fallen over time, the ordering of cities from most 
segregated to least segregated has remained fairly stable, indicated by a correlation 
between 1970 and 1990 dissimilarity of .75. Our 1990 dissimilarity values come from 
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999). We calculate the 1970 and 1980 indexes, using the 
                                                 
10 Cutler and Glaeser (1997) identify 313 MSAs with black populations greater than 1000. We eliminate the 
District of Columbia MSA because residents of the District do not elect any voting members to Congress.  
11 We maintain the 1990 definitions throughout. MSAs are defined by counties outside of New England and 
by towns within. We simply define the same set of counties/towns as an MSA in the three decades.    6
1990 MSA definitions, with Census data for these years.
12 Results are not contingent on 
our measure of segregation. An alternative measure of segregation, the isolation index, 
represents the percentage of Black residents in the average tract in which Blacks live. Our 
results are robust to the substitution of the isolation for the dissimilarity index.  
II.C. Outcomes 
  Government structures vary from town to town both within and across MSAs. 
Thus we focus on the United States House of Representatives, because representation in 
the House is a metric that is comparable nationwide.
13  We measure Black political 
efficacy using both descriptive and substantive congressional outcomes. Descriptive 
representation is the extent to which a group is represented by individuals of that same 
group. However, descriptive representation does not always equal substantive 
representation, or representation by individuals who share the political interests of the 
group.
14 Our outcomes are the following: 
Descriptive Representation 
1)  Black Candidates:  One measure of the extent to which Blacks are 
participants in politics is the fraction of congressional districts in which there is at least 
one Black candidate running for the House. District candidate race data, available only 
for the 1980s and 1990s, are from Washington (2006). The mean of this measure has 
                                                 
12 Because the entire country was not fully census tracked until 1990, this procedure introduces additional 
measurement error as we move backwards in time. Twenty-nine MSAs in 1970 and 69 in 1980 did not 
include sufficient census tracts for us to calculate segregation indexes directly. For these MSAs we 
predicted the segregation index using the 1990 segregation level and the change in percent Black, percent 
in poverty, percent high school graduate and percent employed between 1970 (1980) and 1990.  
13 Additionally the sheer number of local governments—more than 10,000 cities, towns and counties—
within our MSAs makes a focus on local government outcomes infeasible.  
14 For example, imagine a state with 10 districts. Blacks make up 10% of the state population. If all Blacks 
are located in one district then that district will likely elect a Black representative. Yet, on average Blacks 
will not likely have their substantive interests met by this legislative delegation as Blacks only directly 
influence (through the vote) one tenth of their state’s representatives.     7
increased between the two decades. (See Table I for the decade by decade means of all 
outcome variables.)  
2)  Black Representatives: A stricter measure of participation in politics 
comes from looking to the election winners. Our second efficacy outcome is the fraction 
of Representatives who are Black.   
Substantive Representation 
3)  Democratic Representatives: In two-party elections, Black Americans cast 
their votes in favor of the Democratic candidate 70 to 90% of the time (McDermott 
1998). Hence, we take the fraction of Representatives who are Democrats as a measure of 
Black political efficacy. This measure is falling over our sample period. Democrats’ 
majority (in terms of number of members) over Republicans in the House shrank from 
the 1970s to the 1980s and was overturned in the 1990s.   
4)  Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Voting Record Score: 
Representative party is a coarse measure of political views. In addition to party, we look 
at Representative voting on civil rights issues as rated by the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights (LCCR).
15 LCCR is a liberal leaning interest group that chooses 
approximately ten to twenty congressional votes per session that the organization 
considers as crucial to promoting civil rights in this country. A representative’s LCCR 
score in a particular session is the fraction of these votes in which the representative votes 
in accordance with the LCCR’s position.
16 This measure is increasingly correlated with 
Democratic representative over time.
17 
                                                 
15 The scores for the 91
st through 109
th Congresses are available on the LCCR website, 
www.civilrights.org.  
16 We do not adjust these scores for comparability across years as prescribed by Groseclose, Levitt and 
Snyder (1999). Such an adjustment would be inappropriate in this analysis because it relies on restrictions   8
5)  Congressional Black Caucus Voting Record Score: Civil rights is not the 
only category of legislation of interest to Blacks.
18 We follow Cameron, Epstein and 
O’Halloran (1996) to create a second voting score based on the fraction of the ballots in 
which the legislator votes in agreement with the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC).
19 
Founded in 1969 by the then thirteen Black members of Congress, the CBC has as its 
goals “to positively influence the course of events pertinent to African Americans and 
others of similar experience and situation, and to achieve greater equity for persons of 
African descent in the design and content of domestic and international programs and 
services.”
20 Every Black member of Congress, since the CBC’s founding, with the 
exception of JC Watts (R-OK), has been a member.
21 The caucus currently has 43 
members. The mean of Representatives’ average agreement with the Congressional Black 
Caucus has remained about .6 across decades.
22 This measure is highly correlated with 
LCCR score across time.
23 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the changes in a representative’s mean preferences from year to year. As we have no prior evidence on 
the relationship between segregation and representative preference, we are more comfortable allowing 
preferences to vary freely. Lack of comparability imposes no limitations in interpreting our regression 
coefficients as all average LCCR scores within a regression are composed of averages of the same 
congressional sessions. Nonetheless, across decades, LCCR scores are highly correlated (.84 or greater) 
with Poole and Rosenthal’s inter-temporally comparable Nominate scores available at www.voteview.com. 
17 The correlation is .5 in the 1970s, .67 in the 1980s and .87 in the 1990s.  
18 In addition voting record scores compiled by interest groups have been criticized for including only the 
most polarizing votes. See for example Snyder (1992).  
19 Data on how each member of Congress voted in each roll call vote are available on Poole and 
Rosenthal’s website www.voteview.com .  
20 Goals taken from the Congressional Black Caucus Website 
(http://www.cbcfinc.org/About/CBC/index.html). 
21 Non-Black members of Congress are not permitted to join. Membership restrictions obtained in a 
communication with Myra Dandridge, spokesperson for the Congressional Black Caucus, July 7, 2006.  
22 We limit our attention to only those votes in which 60% or more of the CBC voted in agreement. Our 
results are robust to a change from 60 to 100%. 
23 The correlation is .85 in the 1970s, .82 in the 1980s and .91 in the 1990s.   9
In order to merge MSAs with their congressional outcomes, we match an MSA’s 
counties to its respective congressional district(s) for each congressional session.
24 
Because an MSA may contain more than one district
25 we average outcomes across 
districts within an MSA to create MSA/Congress level outcomes.
26  (We use the mean 
rather than the median following Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) who argue 
that the scores represent probabilities of voting in favor of a piece of legislation.) Then, to 
attain our best estimate of efficacy within a redistricting period, we average across the 
five Congresses to create MSA/decade level outcomes.  
The focus on the House of Representatives drives our definition of decades. The 
number of representatives that each state may send to the House is defined by the 
decennial census. The first election affected by each census is the election in the year 
ending with 2 following that census. For example, the number of districts per state 
calculated using the 1970 census was first relevant for the 1972 House elections. Those 
elected in 1972 served from January 1973 to January 1975. Thus we define our decades 
to include all elections and congresses based on the respective census.
27 (Recall that the 
measures of segregation are also created using the census.)   
                                                 
24 In the case of New England we do the match by county and by town. The county match may give an 
overestimate of the districts in the MSA because counties are not contained by MSA boundaries within 
New England. On the other hand towns may give an underestimate of the districts in the MSA because it is 
not possible to look up the correspondence between unincorporated areas within an MSA and a district. 
County/district correspondence comes from 103
rd Congressional District Geographic Entity File, 1990 
(ICPSR 6425) and Census of Population and Housing, 1980, Congressional District Equivalency File, 99
th 
Congress. County/district correspondence for 1970, town/district correspondence for all years, and intra 
decennial redistricting correspondence come from Congressional District Atlas (multiple years).  
25 Or portions of more than one district.  
26 We would like to weight this average by the fraction of MSA residents who live in the district. 
Unfortunately, these data are only available for the districts created with the 1990 redistricting. For 1990 
we run specifications using outcomes created by weighted averages as well as those created by simple 
averages. Results are robust to this change.   
27 Although the majority of congressional redistricting is done between the census year and the election that 
follows two years later, states are free to redistrict at any time. Therefore we match MSAs to districts by 
congressional session and not by decade.   10
II.D Methodology 
  For each decade, we are interested in the following equation:   
(2) outcomei = αι + β1(segregation)i + β2 (perblk)i + ui 
where outcome is one of the political efficacy measures defined in the previous section, 
segregation is the dissimilarity score and perblk is the percent of the MSA’s population 
that is Black. Blacks may be more efficacious where they are a larger percentage of the 
population. We condition on percent Black to isolate the effects of segregation, 
conditional on area ethnic heterogeneity. Previous literature has shown an association 
between demographic characteristics (such as education, poverty status, employment 
status and age) and political participation and political choice. (See for example Leighly 
and Nagler, 1992 and Wolfinger and Rosenstone,1980).  However, we do not control for 
these demographics in our most basic specification because the demographic make up of 
the MSA is in fact endogenous to segregation. For example, Ananat (2007) shows that 
segregation affects the average level of education, income and even movement into an 
MSA. By omitting these endogenous demographics we capture the full effect of 
segregation on each outcome of interest (including any intermediary effects on 
demographic characteristics.)
28  
  The limitation of equation 2 is that the coefficient β1 cannot be interpreted 
causally due to the potential endogeneity of segregation. For example, perhaps non-Black 
residents’ preference for interactions with Blacks influences both the level of segregation 
and the level of Black efficacy--such an influence might lead our OLS results to be 
biased in a negative direction. Or perhaps the most politically active Blacks prefer to live 
                                                 
28 Our 2SLS results are robust to the inclusion of controls for demographic characteristics, as we 
demonstrate in the results section.   11
primarily among Blacks--such a preference might lead our OLS results to be biased in a 
positive direction.  The great shortcoming of the OLS results is that we cannot even sign 
their bias.  
We overcome this limitation by following a 2SLS approach; we instrument for 
segregation using Ananat’s (2007) railroad division index (RDI). Before the Great 
Migration, Blacks predominantly lived in former slave holding states.
29 The RDI 
instrument exploits the fact that the Great Migration, the large movement of Blacks from 
the South to the North during the years 1915 to 1950, occurred after the vast majority of 
the country’s present day railroad tracks had been laid. The more subdivisions within a 
city created by the tracks, the easier it was in that city to confine (segregate) Blacks in 












where i represents a subdivision of the central city of an MSA created by railroad track.
30 
An RDI of zero would mean that there are no tracks running through the MSA. An RDI 
of one would mean that the MSA is infinitely divided by railroads with each area having 
an area of near zero.
31  
  Our first stage equation is 
(4) segregationi = αι + δ1(RDI)i + γ1(tracklength)i + γ2(perblk)i + ui.  
                                                 
29 Ananat (2007) estimates that in 1910 90% of Blacks still lived in former slave states of Delaware, 
Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas and Arkansas. 
30 Ananat (2007) defines the center city as the four kilometer radius circle around the centroid of the 
population center in the early 20
th century. Such an approach means that historical variations in city size 
will not distort the RDI measure.  
31 Atack and Passell (1994) estimate that 75% of total track in the United States had been laid by 1900. 
Nonetheless, to better capture the pre-Great Migration track configuration Ananat (2007) calculates the 
RDI using historical maps with a median year of creation of 1909.     12
There is a mechanical relationship between tracklength and RDI.  We therefore control 
for tracklength out of a concern that the amount of track laid in a city may relate to how 
prosperous the city was and therefore how desirable a location it was for, for instance, the 
most politically efficacious Blacks (Ananat 2007). (Our first stage estimates for the three 
decades are found in the first three columns of Table II.) 
  Our second stage is 
(5) outcomei = αι+ β1(segregation)i + β2 (perblk)i + β3 (tracklength) + ui.. 
  The assumption of our identification strategy is that RDI at the beginning of the 
twentieth century does not predict Black civic efficacy at the century’s end, except 
through its effect on segregation. There are two obvious ways in which that assumption 
could be violated. First, RDI could be correlated with early twentieth century MSA 
characteristics which impact later twentieth century political efficacy. Second, the 
instrument may have a direct impact on Black civic efficacy or its correlates. 
RDI does not predict early twentieth century MSA politics. Table III presents 
regressions of the percent of MSA voters
32 casting ballots for the Democratic candidate 
in the six presidential elections that occurred between 1900 and 1920. The sample is the 
non-New England MSAs in our 2SLS sample. We omit New England because in that 
region MSAs are not defined by counties; the early twentieth century voting data is 
available by county. RDI is not a significant predictor of Democratic voting. Thus Table 
III provides no evidence that our instrument affects present day Black civic efficacy 
through an impact on early twentieth century politics.  
                                                 
32 The denominator is the number who cast ballots for one of the two major parties.    13
   Ananat (2007) further demonstrates that RDI is not correlated with early twentieth 
century demographic and economic characteristics. Using the 1910 and 1920 censuses, 
she shows that RDI does not predict early century demographic descriptors of the 
population including population size, percent Black, level of European immigrant 
segregation,
33 and physical size of the MSA. Nor does RDI predict early century 
economic outcomes such as the literacy rate, the number of street cars per capita, labor 
force participation rate and the share of employment in trade, manufacturing and 
railroads.  
As stated above, an additional concern about our identification strategy is that 
RDI may have a direct impact on Black civic efficacy or its correlates. Ananat (2007) 
presents evidence that the instrument does not impact later twentieth century outcomes, 
except through its effect on segregation. The concern is that railroad configuration could 
impact land values and therefore residential income segregation. She provides evidence 
against this channel by demonstrating that RDI does not predict 1990 income 
segregation.
34 Further, given her results of a positive relationship between RDI and White 
economic outcomes (in contrast to a negative relationship between RDI and Black 
economic outcomes), Ananat (2007) argues that RDI operates through race rather than 
through income.  
  One limitation of this identification strategy is that we can only create the 
instrument for those MSAs which meet two criteria: 1) They are not located in former 
                                                 
33 European ethnic immigrant segregation was then at its historical peak, according to Massey and Denton 
(1993). Its historical peak was quite low relative to the historical peak of black segregation—the maximum 
isolation index was 0.39 for Italians in Worcester, MA, in 1910 (Vigdor 2006); by contrast, the median 
isolation index for blacks in 1970 was .37.  
34 Income segregation is insignificant in the U.S. relative to racial segregation; the highest dissimilarity 
index for income in 1990 is .28, while the lowest 1990 dissimilarity for African-Americans is .33.     14
slave states and 2) Ananat (2007) was able to locate an historical map to calculate the 
RDI for the MSA.
35 Therefore our 2SLS results will be limited to only 121 of the 312 
MSAs in our full sample.
36 In terms of segregation, representative race and representative 
voting patterns, the full sample and the 2SLS sub-sample are quite comparable.
37 The 
final three columns of Table I provide the means for the 2SLS sample. However, 
reflecting the fact that slightly more than half of Blacks continue to live in the South,
38 
percent Black is smaller in the 2SLS sample than in the full sample. In the next section 
we detail our results. 
III Results 
III.A. Political Efficacy 
  Segregation had a negative impact on Black civic efficacy in the 1990s, results in 
Table IV indicate. Each cell in the table presents the coefficient on the dissimilarity index 
from a different regression specification. Each row reflects a different outcome; each 
column reflects a different specification. The first three columns provide the results from 
OLS regressions on the full sample, the non-South sample and the 2SLS sample. While 
these results are not interpretable causally due to the endogeneity of segregation, they 
serve to indicate the extent of generalizeability of our 2SLS results. As we move from a 
sample of MSAs from across the nation to the non-South sample, although all results are 
insignificant, coefficients vary considerably. One coefficient changes sign. Three of five 
change by an order of magnitude. As we noted in the data and methods section, Ananat 
                                                 
35 There are 77 non-Southern MSAs for which Ananat (2007) could not locate a map.  
36 See Appendix Table I for a list of the MSAs included in the 2SLS analysis. 
37 With the exception of the fraction Black candidates in 1990. The 1990 redistricting created 13 new safe 
Black districts, all in southern states. (Clayton 2000).  
38 Fifty-four percent of Blacks lived in the South in March 2004. (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population 
Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2004, Racial Statistics Branch, Population Division.)   15
(2007) was not able to locate historical maps for all non-southern MSAs. As we move 
from column 2 (all non-southern MSAs) to column 3 (non-southern MSAs for which we 
have the RDI instrument), coefficients are more stable. Thus while our results can likely 
be generalized to the non-South, generalizing to MSAs in the South seems less tenable on 
empirical as well as theoretical grounds. Previous research has found that the politics of 
race differs between the South and the non-South (Massey and Denton 1994; Cameron, 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1996).   
  Column 4 provides evidence of the causal impact of segregation on Black civic 
efficacy outside of the South. Regardless of how efficacy is measured, the relationship 
between segregation and efficacy is negative, although not always statistically significant. 
The first row of the table indicates that as segregation increases, Blacks seem to 
participate less in the political process. The -.441 in the first row of the table implies that 
as segregation increases by .10, the fraction of Black House candidates decreases by .04. 
Alternatively as segregation increases by a standard deviation the fraction of Black House 
candidates decreases by a significant .47 standard deviations. Moving down the row, a 
one standard deviation increase in segregation in an MSA causes the fraction of Black 
representatives to fall by a significant .63 standard deviations, the fraction of Democratic 
representatives to fall by .59 standard deviations, the average representative’s LCCR 
score to fall by a significant .82 standard deviations and the average representative’s 
propensity to vote in accordance with the Congressional Black Caucus to fall by.72 
standard deviations. For aid in interpreting the score results, note that a standard 
deviation in LCCR (or CBC) score separates a staunch Republican like former 
Representative Robert Barr (R-GA), who was a leader in the fight to impeach President   16
Clinton, from a moderate Republican like former Representative Robert Simmons (R-
CT), who lost his seat in the 2006 election. Moderate Democrat former Representative 
Gary Condit (D-CA) is also separated by a standard deviation on these scores from 
Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), the first female speaker of the House of 
Representatives.
39  
  The remainder of the table provides the results of various checks to our basic 
specification.The number of Blacks living in each MSA varies considerably. Therefore it 
is possible that our column 4 results reflect a relationship that predominantly prevails in 
MSAs in which few Blacks actually live. We investigate whether such heterogeneous 
treatment effects are driving our findings in specifications reported in column 5. 
Specifications reported in this column are the basic specifications weighted by the log of 
the number of Black residents of the MSA. We choose to weight in logs rather than levels 
because we are uncomfortable allowing an MSA’s influence on our estimation to be 
proportional to the size of its Black population due to the presence of three outlier MSAs 
with Black populations an order of magnitude greater than the sample mean.
40 Our results 
are robust to the change from the unweighted to the weighted specification as indicated 
by the results of column 5. Thus our basic results do not seem to be driven by MSAs in 
which few Blacks actually reside. (Results are also robust to the exclusion of the three 
outlier MSAs.) 
As indicated in the data and methods section, district outcomes are averaged to 
form MSA level outcomes. For the 1990s only, we have data that allow us to population-
                                                 
39 These differences calculated based on the 107
th Congress, the most recent term included in our analysis.  
40 In the 2SLS sample the average number of Blacks in an MSA in 1990 is approximately 50,000. Three 
MSAs—Detroit, Philadelphia and Los Angeles—have Black populations of greater than 500,000. Level 
weighted regressions would essentially be driven by these three MSAs.   17
weight our averages to form a better measure of the representation that the average MSA 
resident faces.
41 The final column of the table presents the coefficients from 
specifications which use the population-weighted measures. In terms of both magnitude 
and significance, coefficients are little changed from column 4 to column 6, indicating 
that our column 4 results are not driven by our weighting procedure. Thus we can be 
more confident in our results as we trace the impact of segregation back through the 
1970s. 
  Looking back across decades, we learn that segregation has had a consistent 
negative impact on Black civic efficacy since the first redistricting following the Voting 
Rights Act. See Table V Panel A for these results. Once again, each cell represents the 
coefficient on the dissimilarity index from a different regression. Each row presents a 
different outcome; each column presents the results from the basic specification using 
data from a different decade. Point estimates indicate that a one standard deviation 
increase in segregation decreases the fraction of Black House candidates by ½ to 1 
standard deviation, the fraction of Black House members by ¾ of a standard deviation, 
the fraction of Democrats by ½ to 1 ¼ standard deviations and the average LCCR and 
CBC scores by about one standard deviation. While the point estimates suggest that this 
negative relationship shrinks in magnitude over time, for none of these three outcomes 
can we distinguish between the 1970 and the 1990 coefficient statistically. Although only 
9 of 14 coefficients are statistically significant, the consistency of the sign of the results is 
evidence of the enduring negative impact of segregation on Black political outcomes. In 
Appendix Table II we demonstrate the robustness of the results to additional controls. 
The additional covariates decrease precision, but leave the pattern of results unchanged.  
                                                 
41 Weights are based on initial—1992—redistricting.    18
III.B. Mechanisms 
 Individuals’  political  viewpoints are aggregated to form area-wide political 
outcomes in a multi-staged process. First, a citizen must form a viewpoint. Second, that 
citizen must decide whether it is worth his or her while to make the effort to express that 
viewpoint in the voting booth. Thirdly, the citizen’s vote (if cast) must be aggregated 
with others’ votes according to institutional regulations to determine the winning 
policy.
42 (In the case of House races, the institutional regulations say that votes are 
summed, and representatives are therefore chosen, by district.)    
At what point(s) in this process are Blacks in more segregated MSAs falling 
behind those Blacks living in less segregated MSAs? Is it that Black/non-Black political 
viewpoints are more divergent in more segregated metropolitan areas? Are Blacks’ 
feelings of political efficacy (and therefore their belief in the value of voting) decreasing 
in segregation? Are non-Blacks’ feelings of efficacy increasing in segregation? Or are the 
political institutions—the districts—designed in a manner that is less conducive to Black 
substantive representation in more segregated areas?  
  In the remainder of the paper we trace the process backward from political 
outcomes to the development of political viewpoints to examine at what point(s) 
segregation causes Blacks to be less efficacious. 
III.B.1. Redistricting 
  While the process of redistricting varies from state to state, in no state is the 
process determined orthogonally to the racial composition of the neighborhoods within. 
Federal case law stipulates that districts be compact and contiguous (Stokes 1998). 
                                                 
42 We ignore a fourth step where the elected politician must choose whether to enact the policy that the 
people desire. We assume, given its repeated game nature, that House members do enact the will of the 
people on average.    19
Therefore the extent of segregation in neighborhoods may mechanically impact upon the 
racial composition of districts. Given that it is a federal requirement that redistricting 
schemes provide “equality of opportunity” for minority voters (Stokes 1998) there is little 
doubt that state legislatures pay attention to the racial makeup of the districts when 
deciding whether to approve any proposed districting plan. Thus rather than treat the 
districts as exogenous, we empirically estimate the relationship between Black/non-Black 
racial segregation and district racial composition. 
  There is a long literature in political science debating the implications of district 
demographic composition for Black political efficacy. (See Grofman and Davidson 1992 
for an overview.) In the most extensive empirical examination of the question to date, 
Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) investigate the relationship between a district’s 
percentage of Black voters and its representative’s party and LCCR score. Using their 
estimates in simulation, the authors conclude that in all parts of the United States with the 
exception of the South
43 the optimal strategy for maximizing Black representation in an 
area is to equalize the Black population across districts within that area.
44  
  In Table V Panel B we examine the extent to which segregation predicts the 
spread of Blacks in districts throughout a metropolitan area.
45 It is possible that Blacks 
are less efficacious in more segregated areas because, following the reasoning of 
Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996), Blacks are confined to more heavily Black 
                                                 
43 In the South, the optimal strategy, according to Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996), is to create as 
many districts of about 47% Black as possible. 
44 Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) used states as the area of investigation; however, as one vote in 
Congress is equal to any other vote in Congress, the aggregation of representatives to states in no way 
drives their simulation results. Therefore their results should be applicable to delegations that represent 
metropolitan areas as well. Nonetheless, the political reality is that the redistricting process is controlled by 
the state legislature and districts must fall within state boundaries. So for MSAs that cross state boundaries, 
it may not be possible to equalize percent Black throughout the MSA. This constraint, however, does not 
alter the relationship between equalization of percent Black within an area and Black efficacy.   
45 See Appendix Table III for means to accompany this Table V Panel B.   20
districts in these metro areas. To investigate this supposition we continue to run models 
of the form of Equation 5 where our outcomes are now measures of the demographic 
characteristics of the districts within the MSA.
46 The first row of the panel examines the 
influence of segregation on the fraction of districts in which Blacks comprise less than 10 
percent of the population. Blacks are 5-6 percent of the population in the average district 
in the 2SLS sample. Thus negative coefficients on segregation in these regressions would 
indicate that in more segregated MSAs Blacks are less likely to be spread evenly across 
districts, which would be one explanation for their efficacy decreasing in segregation. 
However, as the results of the first row of the table indicate, segregation is positively and 
significantly associated with the fraction of districts that are under 10 percent Black in all 
three sample periods. We consider districts that are more than 10 percent Black as 
“heavily” Black for our northern sample, where only 5-10 percent of districts fall in this 
category. But there is heterogeneity in percent Black amongst this group of districts. In an 
un-tabled regression we create dummies for 0-10, 10-25, 25-50 and 50 or more percent 
Black to allow for the impact of segregation to differ across the three categories of 
“heavily” Black districts. We find no such variation. Blacks in more segregated MSAs 
are significantly less likely to be living in districts that are 10-25 percent Black. The signs 
are mixed and insignificant on 25-50 and 50 and higher percent Black.  Thus we find no 
evidence that segregation lessens Black efficacy by isolating Blacks in heavily Black 
districts.  
  In the final row of Table V we measure the spread of Blacks across districts 
within an MSA using a different metric: the standard deviation of the districts’ percent 
                                                 
46 Because of data limitations, we are unable to measure the percent Black for each redistricting that occurs. 
Therefore we measure these outcomes once per decade, at the time of the first election following the most 
recent census.    21
Black. (The limitation of this measure is, of course, that it is not defined for MSAs whose 
residents are all assigned to the same district.) Once again, we find no evidence of 
segregation increasing the variation in percent Black across districts. In fact the 
relationship between segregation and standard deviation is negative, although 
insignificant, across the three decades. Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) assert 
that substantive representation of Blacks is decreasing in the standard deviation of district 
percent Black in an area. Assuming their assertion correct, the results of Table V Panel B 
provide no evidence that district configuration is the mechanism by which segregation 
has lessened Black political efficacy across three decades.
47   
III.B.2 Voter Turnout 
  A second possible mechanism by which segregation may impact Black civic 
efficacy is through political participation, particularly in the form of voting. Ananat 
(2007) shows that segregation significantly increases the rate of poverty amongst Blacks 
while significantly decreasing the poverty rate amongst Whites.  We know from previous 
work that lower-income subgroups are less likely to vote. (See for example Leighly and 
Nagler, 1992.) Thus it may be the case that segregation decreases Black voter turnout 
and/or increases non-Black voter turnout, resulting in a decrease in Black civic efficacy.
48  
  We examine the impact of segregation on voting behavior (as well as political 
attitudes) using data from the National Election Studies (NES), a biennial survey of 
                                                 
47 We also investigated the possibility that non-MSA residents who share districts with MSA residents may 
be more (less) sympathetic to Black political interests and therefore driving the relationship between 
segregation and Black civic efficacy. However we find no support for such a hypothesis. We find no 
evidence that more segregated MSAs are carved into significantly more/fewer districts than less segregated 
MSAs. These findings are not surprising given that our results in Table IV are not altered significantly by 
population weighting outcomes. 
48 This is just one mechanism by which segregation could impact turnout. Coate and Conlin’s (2004) group 
rule utilitarian model suggests that segregation could impact turnout because in a segregated area it may be 
easier to enforce group norms.    22
United States residents of voting age. Using these data we run 2SLS models, separately 
for Black and non-Black respondents, of the following form: 
(6) outcomei = αι+ β1(segregation)i + β2(tracklength)i + ui.. 
(7) segregationi = αι + δ1(RDI)i + γ1(tracklength)i + ui 
where segregation is now the predicted level of segregation in the respondent’s MSA.
49 
We conduct our analyses separately by decade
50 and by racial group: Black and non-
Black. When possible, we substitute the first wave of the National Survey of Black 
Americans, fielded in 1979-1980, for the 1970 Black NES sample, in which our first 
stage was not significant. (See Appendix Table IV.) 
  Across decades, we find no significant relationship between segregation and voter 
turnout of either Blacks or non-Blacks. (See the first row of Table VI for these results). 
Further, point estimates do not support the contention that the segregation/civic efficacy 
link runs through turnout. The relationship between segregation and turnout is not 
significant, except for Blacks in the 1970s, when it is positive. Thus we find no support 
for the supposition that segregation decreases Black efficacy by increasing non-Black 
turnout and/or decreasing Black turnout. 
III.B.3. Political Attitudes 
  Thus far our findings suggest that neither district configuration nor racial 
variation in turnout accounts for segregation’s negative impact on Black political 
efficacy. A third explanation is that political views of Blacks and non-Blacks are more 
divergent in more segregated areas. Blacks are not a majority of residents in any time or 
                                                 
49 We use respondents’ states and congressional districts to match them to our time invariantly defined 
MSAs. In cases where a district lies in more than one MSA we define the respondent’s level of segregation 
as the average segregation in the MSAs. Reported regression results are thus clustered at the district level. 
However, the significance of our results is robust to clustering at the state level.  
50 We define the survey years 1972-1980 as the 1970s, 1982-1990 as the 1980s and 1992-2000 the 1990s.   23
place in our sample frame. Therefore, as non-Black political views move increasingly far 
from Black political views, by definition, Blacks move farther away from the mean (and 
likely the median) viewpoint. We examine the evidence for the divergent views 
explanation in the remainder of Table VI. In this table we continue to present the results 
from models of the form of equations 6 and 7 using the NES (and NSBA where possible.) 
  In the second panel of the table entitled “Attitudes toward Race” we explore the 
impact of segregation on racial tolerance and support for policies which benefit Blacks. 
Our first outcome is non-Black respondents’ feelings about Blacks measured on a scale 
of 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). The -.889 coefficient in the 1970s regression 
is unfortunately too imprecise to be informative. However, the 1980s and 1990s 
coefficients say that an increase in segregation of one standard deviation results in a 
significant decrease in non-Black feelings about Blacks of .06 and .18 standard deviations 
respectively.
51 In the remainder of the row we examine Black feelings toward Whites (the 
largest non-Black subgroup). Point estimates suggest that feelings about Whites are 
increasing in segregation in the 1980s and decreasing in segregation in the 1990s. 
However, all estimates are far too imprecise to be informative. 
  Next, we examine how segregation impacts feelings about race-based policy. The 
focal question asks respondents whether they support government policies to improve the 
social and economic position of Blacks. Respondents were asked to place themselves on 
a seven point scale from a low of 1 (Government should help Blacks) to a high of 7 
(Blacks should help themselves).
52 Non-Blacks have a mean score for the measure of 
between four and five across decades. However, across time, Blacks increasingly support 
                                                 
51 See Appendix Table V for means and standard deviations to accompany Table VI.  
52 Prior to 1988, the question asked about “Blacks (Negroes) and other minority groups.” Beginning in 
1988, the question focused solely on Blacks.     24
the view that Blacks should help themselves (from a mean of 2.3 in the 1970s to 3.8 in 
the 1990s). Point estimates of the impact of segregation on this belief suggest that the 
tendency, among non-Blacks, to believe that Blacks should help themselves is increasing 
in segregation across decades. The relationship is significant in the 1980s and 1990s, 
when a one standard deviation increase in segregation predicts an increase in this belief 
of .11 and .17 standard deviations respectively. Results for Blacks, though never 
significant, are opposite signed from non-Blacks in the 1980s and near zero in the 1990s. 
Thus the “Attitudes toward Race” panel provides evidence that the relationship between 
segregation and Black civic efficacy may be driven by non-Black support for Blacks and 
policies that favor Blacks, as this support is decreasing in segregation.   
  Next we look at the impact of segregation on political attitudes more generally. 
The first outcome of interest is the respondent’s view of how liberal/conservative s/he is 
on a scale from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative).  Across decades, the 
non-Black mean on this measure has hovered around 4.3 while the Black mean has 
grown from 3.3 to 3.8. Reported in the first row under “Political Attitudes,” point 
estimates from specifications using this outcome suggest that, across decades, 
polarization in political views is increasing in segregation. While conservative 
identification is increasing in segregation amongst non-Blacks, liberal identification is 
increasing in segregation amongst Blacks. The relationship is significant only for non-
Blacks in the 1980s and 1990s, where a one standard deviation increase in segregation 
increases the mean tendency toward conservatism by .18 and .27 standard deviations 
respectively.   25
  The second more general political attitude we examine is party identification. The 
NES asks respondents to place themselves on a scale from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 
(strong Republican). Not surprisingly, given Blacks’ tendency to vote Democratic, across 
decades, the mean of this measure is approximately four for non-Blacks and two for 
Blacks. Amongst non-Blacks we see that segregation increases the tendency to identify as 
Republican; coefficients indicate a significant relationship for the 1970s and 1990s, when 
a one standard deviation increase in segregation increases Republican identification by .4 
and .14 standard deviations respectively. Identification translates into behavior, or at least 
reported behavior, as the results of the final row of the table demonstrate a significant 
negative relationship between segregation and votes for the Democratic Party, in 1970 
and 1990. The impact of segregation on Black party identification and vote choice are 
unclear, as insignificant coefficients flip signs across the decades.   
  Thus the results of Table VI suggest that political attitudes may explain the 
relationship between segregation and decreased Black civic efficacy. Segregation 
increases non-Blacks’ tendency to identify and vote conservatively and to oppose policies 
that favor Blacks. Point estimates suggest that segregation, on the other hand, increases 
Blacks’ tendency to identify as liberals. This evidence points not only to an explanation 
for decreased efficacy for Blacks in more segregated areas, but also suggests that Blacks 
in the most segregated areas are less efficacious than our Table V results suggest. Black 
liberal identification is increasing in segregation, while the tendency for representatives 
to vote liberally on issues of interest to Blacks is decreasing in segregation.  
Such divergence could come about in either or both of two ways:  1) Increased 
contact with Blacks in less segregated cities could cause non-Blacks to hold more   26
favorable views toward policies which benefit Blacks. This could arise because of 
interactions with Black neighbors as postulated by the contact hypothesis
53 or from a 
feeling that they will benefit more directly from policies that benefit Blacks when they 
live nearer to Blacks. 2) Alternatively, the link between segregation and efficacy may be 
due to selection. Non-Blacks who hold the least favorable views toward policies which 
Blacks support may choose to live in the most segregated cities.  
Distinguishing between these two mechanisms is important for understanding the 
impact of segregation on Black political efficacy nationally. If segregation causes 
decreased efficacy through lack of contact, then increased segregation in MSA 1 will 
decrease Black efficacy in MSA 1 and therefore Black efficacy nationally, on average. If 
segregation causes decreased efficacy through selection, then increased segregation in 
MSA 1 will decrease efficacy in MSA 1 but may increase efficacy in MSA 2 as those 
who hold the least favorable views of policies that Blacks support move from MSA 2 to 
MSA 1. Distinguishing between contact and selection, however, is not important for 
understanding the effects of segregation on those individuals who face budget constraints 
that prevent their relocating from MSA 1 to MSA 2.  
  In Table VII we investigate whether selection and/or contact explain the impact of 
segregation on Black political efficacy. The first three columns of the table focus on 
selection. In these columns, we repeat the attitudinal analysis of Table VI; however, we 
limit the sample to those non-Black individuals
54 over the age of 30 who moved to the 
                                                 
53 See for example Brophy (1945), Deutsch and Collins (1951), Jackman and Crane (1986), Putnam (1966) 
and Wilner et. al. (1952).  
54 We do not perform this exercise for Blacks due to the small sample size.    27
community
55 within the past two years. In other words, we focus on adults who recently 
selected to live in the area. Looking at the first measure, the Black thermometer, we find 
in both the 1970s and 1980s, the relationship between selecting a more segregated area 
and attitude toward Blacks is insignificant. However, in the 1990s we find that those who 
have chosen more segregated areas have significantly more negative ratings of Blacks. In 
fact in the 1990s, for four of five attitudinal outcomes we find that individuals who select 
more segregated areas hold significantly more conservative views than those who select 
less segregated areas. At least for the 1990s, it appears that selection does play a role in 
linking segregation and decreased Black political efficacy.  
  In the final three columns of Table VII we explore whether contact (or lack 
thereof) is another path from segregation to efficacy. The ideal methodology for 
exploring this question would be to randomly assign individuals to communities. Boisjoly 
et. al (2006) use such a methodology to find that white college students who, in their first 
year of school, were randomly assigned Black roommates, hold more positive views of 
affirmative action several years after college entry than those who were assigned white 
roommates. But whether these results are generalizeable to the community level is 
unknown. Unable to randomly assign individuals to MSAs, we focus our contact analysis 
on non-Black individuals thirty years of age and younger.
56 Younger individuals have 
had less of an opportunity to leave the locale that their parents chose for them and to 
move to their ideal community. Clearly two limitations of this methodology are that: 1) 
Some younger individuals have relocated from their parents’ hometowns (or made a 
                                                 
55 The NES asks, “How long have you lived here in your present city/town/township/county?” The measure 
is less than ideal for our purposes as a respondent may move to a different county but remain in the same 
MSA.  
56 The somewhat more convincing strategy of relating attitudes to MSA of birth is not possible because the 
NES identifies only state, but not MSA or county or district, of birth.   28
deliberate decision to stay) and 2) The parents did select these communities. For these 
reasons the results of the second half of Table VII are only suggestive.   
The Table VII column 4-6 results suggest that contact affects non-Blacks’ 
attitudes toward Blacks. We see in the 1990s that young people who live in more 
segregated areas have significantly less positive views of Blacks. The results on the 
remaining attitudinal outcomes are less informative. Coefficients are not significantly 
different than the significant results we find for the full sample, suggesting that those who 
were placed in more segregated communities developed more conservative attitudes than 
those placed in less segregated communities. However, results are imprecise and 
insignificant. Thus the results of Table VII show that selection (at least in the 1990s) 
plays a role in the impact of segregation on non-Black attitudes and therefore Black 
political outcomes. The table provides some evidence, particularly in regards to non-
Blacks’ views of Blacks, that segregation also impacts attitudes through decreased 
contact amongst the races.  
IV Conclusion  
  Blacks in more segregated metropolitan areas fare worse than their counterparts in 
less segregated areas on a variety of economic outcomes. In this paper, we explore the 
connection between segregation and political efficacy, an outcome that to our knowledge 
has not been studied in relation to segregation.  
  We find that Black political efficacy (as measured by the ability to elect 
representatives who vote in accordance with the preferences of Black voters) is 
decreasing in segregation. This result does not arise because of differential district 
configuration or because of differential voter turnout by race. We do find evidence that   29
the efficacy result is due to variation in attitudes. Non-Blacks have more conservative 
political views in more segregated areas.  Given the belief in this country in the ability to 
effect change through political activity, our results may explain in part why Blacks’ 
economic outcomes are decreasing in segregation.  30
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Table I: Sample Means by Decade  
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
  Full Sample  IV Sample 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Independent Variable of Interest        












Dependent Variables        
Fraction of House general elections with Black candidates




























































Control        












Number of MSAs in Sample  312  312  312  121  121  121 
Notes: 
1 The decades are defined here as the elections of 1972-1980, 1982-1990 and 1992-2000. 
2 The decades are defined here as the Congresses that spanned the years 1973-1982, 1983-1992, 1993-2002.  
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Table II: First Stage, by Decade 
  1970 1980 1990 






N  121 121 121 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Specifications control for track length and percent Black.  ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
1 The constant 1930 sample are those MSAs for which Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) calculate segregation 
indexes and for which Ananat (2007) calculates RDI. 





Table III: Relationship Between Instrument and Democratic share of Presidential Vote 1900-1920 
  1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 
Railroad Division Index  0.057 
[0.086]   
0.082
[0.065]   
0.087
[0.057]   
-0.171
[0.130]   
0.004 
[0.053]   
0.065
[0.049]   
Sample size  94 94 96 99 99 99
Notes: The sample does not include New England MSAs. All specifications control for length of track. Robust standard errors in brackets.   35
Table IV: Impact of Segregation on Black Political Efficacy, 1990s 
(Each cell represents the coefficient on the dissimilarity index from a different regression.) 



















Outcome   
Fraction Black House candidates  -0.043
[0.056]   
-0.149
[0.118]   
-0.202
[0.169]   
-0.441




[0.275]   
Fraction Black Representatives  -0.018
[0.058]   
-0.162
[0.120]   
-0.217
[0.171]   
-0.363
[0.206]*   
-0.362
[0.199]*   
-0.383
[0.227]*   
Fraction Democratic Representatives  -0.166
[0.147]   
-0.02
[0.234]   
0.013
[0.294]   
-1.524
[1.131]   
-1.33
[0.990]   
-1.617
[1.187]   
Average Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights score 
0.055
[0.109]   
-0.016
[0.171]   
-0.012
[0.214]   
-1.596
[0.909]*   
-1.47
[0.789]*   
-1.638
[0.944]*   
Average agreement with Congressional 
Black Caucus 
-0.024
[0.065]   
-0.027
[0.106]   
-0.025
[0.131]   
-0.882
[0.535]   
-0.809
[0.471]*   
-0.904
[0.551]   
N 312  190  121  121  121  121 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions control for percent Black. Specifications 4-6 additionally control for length of track. ***denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table V: Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Impact of Segregation on Black Political Efficacy Across Decades 
(Each cell represents the coefficient on the dissimilarity index from a different regression.) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 
Panel A     
Fraction Black House candidates  NA
1  -0.347 
[0.179]*   
-0.441
[0.226]*   
Fraction Black Representatives  -0.079
[0.176]   
-0.145 
[0.142]   
-0.363
[0.206]*   
Fraction Democratic Representatives  -4.074
[2.014]**  
-1.797 
[1.332]   
-1.524
[1.131]   
Average Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Score  -2.514
[1.350]*   
-1.976 
[1.028]*   
-1.596
[0.909]*   
Average Agreement with Congressional Black Caucus  -1.281
[0.675]*   
-1.131 
[0.675]*   
-0.882
[0.535]   
   
Panel B   
Fraction of districts that have percent Black between 0 and 10 1.716
[0.730]**  
1.495 
[0.607]**   
1.637
[0.524]***  
Standard deviation of district percent Black  -1.48
[3.725] 
N=68   
-2.238 
[9.886] 
N=80   
-0.694
[0.622] 
N=77   
 Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications control for percent Black and length of track.  
Sample size=121 except where noted. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level 
and * at the 10 percent level. 
1 Fraction Black House candidates not available for the 1970’s.  
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Table VI: Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Impact of Segregation on Individual Political Behaviors and Attitudes 
(Each cell represents the coefficient on the dissimilarity index from a different regression.) 
 Non-Blacks  Blacks 
  1970s 1980s 1990s  1970s 1980s 1990s 
Outcome         
Political Behaviors         
Voted in most recent election
1  -0.889
[0.782]   
0.196 
[0.206]   
-0.049
[0.135]   
2.826
[1.436]*   
0.741
[0.648]   
-0.997
[0.646]   
Attitudes toward Race         
Black/White Thermometer (0 to 100)  14.207
[25.441]   
-10.56 




[37.733]   
-13.477
[16.480]   
Belief that government should aid Blacks (1) through 
Blacks should help themselves (7) 
2.171
[3.244]   
1.618 




[2.892]   
0.248
[2.374]   
Political Attitudes         
Identification as extremely liberal (1) through extremely 
conservative (7) 
3.33
[2.540]   
2.134 




[1.638]   
-1.184
[2.547]   




[4.985]*   
0.833 
[1.032]   
2.216
[1.242]*   
-0.871
[0.677]   
1.309
[2.070]   
0.265
[1.878]   
Voted for the Democrat in most recent Congressional 
election 
-4.7
[2.781]*   
-0.417 
[0.616]   
-1.015
[0.587]*   
  -0.638
[0.886]   
0.433
[0.307]   
 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the congressional district level (or the MSA level for NSBA specifications) in brackets. All specifications contro for 
length of track. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. The data source is the National Election 
Survey except for the Black 1970s column which comes from the 1979-1980 wave of the National Survey of Black Americans.  
1 The National Survey of Black Americans asks whether the respondent voted in the most recent presidential election. 
2 The National Survey of Black Americans’ outcome is a non-Democrat indicator.   38
Table VII: Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Impact of Segregation on non-Black Individual Political Behaviors and 
Attitudes, Selection vs Environment 
(Each cell represents the coefficient on the dissimilarity index from a different regression.) 
  Selection Contact 
  Moved to community within past two years, 
over age 30 
30 and under 
 1970s  1980s  1990s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
Outcome            
Attitudes toward Race            


















Belief that government should aid Blacks (1) 



















Political Attitudes            
Identification as extremely liberal (1) through 



















Identification as strong Democrat (1) through 







































 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the congressional district level in brackets. All specifications control for length of track.  
***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Appendix Table I: MSAs included in the 2SLS Analysis 
 
Akron, OH  Iowa City, IA  Pueblo, CO 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  Jackson, MI  Reading, PA 
Altoona, PA  Jamestown-Dunkirk, NY  Redding, CA 
Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA  Janesville-Beloit, WI  Reno, NV 
Ann Arbor, MI  Johnstown, PA  Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
Atlantic City, NJ  Joliet, IL  Rochester, NY 
Aurora-Elgin, IL  Kalamazoo, MI  Rockford, IL 
Battle Creek, MI  Kankakee, IL  Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 
Beaver, PA  Lancaster, PA Salem-Gloucester,  MA 
Benton Harbor, MI  Lansing-East Lansing, MI  Salem, OR 
Binghamton, NY  Las Cruces, NM  Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA 
Bloomington, IN  Lawrence, MA  San Francisco, CA 
Boise City, ID  Lawton, OK  Santa Barbara-Santa Maria- 
Boulder-Longmont, CO  Lima, OH  Lompoc, CA 
Bridgeport-Milford, CT  Lorain-Elyria, OH  Santa Cruz, CA 
Brockton, MA  Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 
Buffalo, NY  Lowell, MA-NH  Scranton, PA 
Burlington, VT  Manchester, NH  Seattle, WA 
Canton, OH  Mansfield, OH  Spokane, WA 
Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL  Merced, CA  Springfield, IL 
Chico, CA  Middletown, CT  Springfield, MA 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN  Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI  State College, PA 
Colorado Springs, CO  Muskegon, MI  Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 
Danbury, CT  Newark, NJ  Stockton, CA 
Dayton-Springfield, OH  New Bedford, MA  Syracuse, NY 
Decatur, IL  New Haven-Meriden, CT  Toledo, OH 
Des Moines, IA  New London-Norwich, CT-RI  Trenton, NJ 
Detroit, MI  Niagara, NY  Tucson, AZ 
Duluth, MN-WI  Norwalk, CT  Utica-Rome, NY 
Elmira, NY  Oakland, CA  Vancouver, WA 
Erie, PA  Oklahoma City, OK  Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 
Eugene-Springfield, OR  Olympia, WA  Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 
Fall River, MA-RI  Omaha, NE-IA  Waterbury, CT 
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA  Peoria, IL  Williamsport, PA 
Flint, MI  Philadelphia, PA-NJ  Worcester, MA 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO  Phoenix, AZ  Yakima, W A 
Glens Falls, NY  Pittsfield, MA  York, PA 
Grand Forks, ND-MN  Portland, ME  Youngstown-Warren, OH 
Grand Rapids, MI  Portland, OR  Yuba City, CA 
Hamilton-Middletown, OH  Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester,    
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA  NH-ME   
Hartford, CT  Poughkeepsie, NY   
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Appendix Table II: Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Impact of Segregation on Black Political Efficacy Across Decades, 
Expanded Specification 
(Each cell represents the coefficient on the dissimilarity index from a different regression.) 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 
Panel A     
Fraction Black House candidates  NA
1  -0.588 
[0.466]   
-0.359
[0.232]   
Fraction Black Representatives  -0.003
[0.193]   
-0.237 
[0.314]   
-0.354
[0.217]   
Fraction Democratic Representatives  -3.961
[2.452]   
-4.059 
[3.454]   
-0.655
[0.917]   
Average Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Score  -3.134
[1.875]*   
-3.989 
[2.971]   
-0.943
[0.690]   
Average Agreement with Congressional Black Caucus  -1.538
[0.897]*   
-2.262 
[1.837]   
-0.448
[0.398]   
   
Panel B   
Fraction of districts that have percent Black between 0 and 10 2.158
[1.123]*   
2.806 
[1.802]   
1.607
[0.493]***  
Standard deviation of district percent Black  -0.775
[1.310]   
4.721 
[43.192]   
-0.538
[0.469]   
 Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications control for percent Black, length of track,   percent 
of population under 18, percent poverty, percent employed and percent with a high school diploma. Sample 
size=121 except where noted. ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at 
the 10 percent level. 
1 Fraction Black House candidates not available for the 1970’s.  
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Appendix Table III: Means for District Characteristics Across decades 
 (Standard deviations in parentheses.) 
 1970s 1980s 1990s
Panel A     
Outcome     







N  121 121 121 
     
Panel B     
Outcome     






N  68 80 77 
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Appendix Table IV: First Stage for Political Attitudes  
  National Election Studies  National Survey of Black Americans
 Non-Black  Black   
  1970s  1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1979-1980 














N  3721  3832 3241 248  217  202  379 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the congressional district level  (or the MSA level for NSBA specifications) in brackets. All specifications control for 
length of track. 
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Appendix Table V: Means for Individual Political Behaviors and Attitudes 
(Standard errors in parentheses. Sample size in brackets.) 
  Non-Blacks Blacks 
  1970s  1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s  1990s 
Focal Independent Variable           



















Outcomes           































































Identification as strong Democrat (1) through strong Republican (7)


































The data source is the National Election Survey except for the Black 1970s column which comes from the 1979-1980 wave of the National Survey of Black 
Americans. 
1 The National Survey of Black Americans asks whether the respondent voted in the most recent presidential election. 
2 The National Survey of Black Americans’ outcome is a non-Democrat indicator.  
 